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Choosing Right from Wrong: Industrial Policy and (De)industrialization in 
Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Abstract 
Over the past two and a half decades, the economic landscape of Central and Eastern 
European economies went through several waves of transformation. The demise of traditional 
industries and the rise of the service sector during the 1990s inclined economic structure 
towards deindustrialization. The events over the next years paved the way for the rise of new 
industries in many of these countries and embarked them on the route of reindustrialization. 
However, in some countries the rise of new industries was more modest and took place at a 
much slower pace. Such development can be attributed to the process of industrial 
restructuring as well as industrial policies. The recent rise of awareness about the importance 
of industrial development for the growth and well-being of nations makes it relevant to 
investigate the sources behind changes in the economic structure of Central and Eastern 
European countries. Our findings reveal two groups of CEECs, defined as reindustrializing 
and those going through deindustrialization. The research identifies loss of competitiveness as 
the principal driving force of such an outcome. No support was found for horizontal policies. 
The reindustrialization mainly takes place through productivity improvements in less 
knowledge and technology intensive activities. Such findings are in line with those on the 
position of CEECs in global value chains.  
 
Keywords: CEEC, deindustrialization, reindustrialization, industrial policy 
JEL classification: L16, D02, C36 
 
 
Iz krivog u pravo: Industrijska politika i (de)industrijalizacija u središnjoj i 
istočnoj Europi 
 
Sažetak 
Tijekom protekla dva i pol desetljeća ekonomski krajobraz zemalja središnje i istočne Europe 
prošao je nekoliko valova transformacije. Propast tradicionalnih industrija i uspon uslužnog 
sektora tijekom 1990-ih usmjerili su ekonomsku strukturu prema procesu deindustrijalizacije. 
Događaji narednih godina u nekim zemljama regije otvorili su prostor za rađanje novih 
industrija dok je u drugim nastanak novih industrija bio slabijeg intenziteta. Ovakav razvoj 
događaja može se pripisati procesu industrijskog restrukturiranja i industrijskim politikama. 
Recentni porast svijesti o važnosti industrijskog razvoja za rast i blagostanje nacija zahtijeva 
razumijevanje uzroka promjena u ekonomskoj strukturi zemalja središnje i istočne Europe. 
Istraživanjem su identificirane dvije skupine zemalja označene kao reindustrijalizirajuće i 
deindustrijalizirajuće. Promjene konkurentnosti identificirane su kao ključni pokretač takvog 
ishoda. Rezultati istraživanja ne pružaju potporu horizontalnom pristupu ekonomske politike. 
Reindustrijalizacija je uglavnom pokretana poboljšanjem proizvodnosti izvoza u sektorima 
slabijeg intenziteta znanja i tehnologije u skladu s položajem analiziranih zemalja u 
globalnom lancu dodane vrijednosti.   
 
Ključne riječi: CEEC, deindustrijalizacija, reindustrijalizacija, industrijska politika 
JEL klasifikacija: L16, D02, C36 
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1 Introduction1 
 
Recent years have witnessed a re-emergence of consensus among economists about the 
importance of industrial development for economic growth. Such insights are well-founded in 
the mainstream economic thinking of the 1950s and 1960s. Kuznets (1956), Chenery (1963) 
and more recently Kaldor (1978) highlighted the beneficial within- and between-sectoral 
spillover effects of manufacturing for the well-being of nations. After several decades, the 
transformation of European countries into service-led economies seems to be at halt. The 
messages conveyed by academics increasingly evoke traditional wisdom and speak about the 
necessity of reindustrialization for growth while the focus of policy makers shifts towards the 
creation of impulse for a new wave of industrial development. The consensus about the 
importance of reindustrialization comes along with a shift in the policy paradigm. The 
exposure of the weaknesses of new classical free market policies by the recent global 
economic downturn has paved the way for proactive industrial policies as a remedy for 
market failures. It is largely held that these policies can provide the initial impulse to drive the 
new industrial development of European economies.  
Within the debate about the new industrial development in Europe, the question that 
frequently arises is which industries are needed for countries to be competitive in a globalized 
world. In one of its more recent strategic documents, the European Commission (2014) notes 
that the reindustrialization of European Union’s member states should be based on knowledge 
and technology intensive industries characterized by high productivity and value added, with 
the ability to retain a competitive edge in a globalized world. Such reasoning, however, is not 
new to academics. Ever since the emergence of endogenous growth literature, the 
sophisticated, knowledge and technology intensive industries have been characterized by 
higher growth potential than the sophisticated price-competitive sectors due to their ability of 
differentiation on international markets, but also due to spillover effects on other related 
industries. Empirical evidence from the growth and trade literature (e.g. Hausmann et al., 
2007; Jarreau and Poncet, 2012) supports such reasoning. From there, the necessity of 
industrial policy targeting strategically selected sectors arises as a prerequisite for the 
recovery of European economies.  
The importance of reindustrialization in the EU does not arise solely from the need to 
compete with global rivals but also to diminish the development gaps that exist within the 
                                                      
1 This work was fully supported by Croatian Science Foundation under the project IP-2016-06-3764. 
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association itself. The latter is particularly relevant in the context of Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEECs) hit by the three most recent waves of EU enlargement from 
2004 onwards. For more than two and a half decades, CEECs have been subject to a reform 
package that has included building of market institutions, macroeconomic stability, enterprise 
restructuring, privatization and inflow of foreign direct investment. As the opening balance of 
transition in nearly all of these countries included a heritage of over-industrialized economic 
structure, the focus of economic policy was on the promotion of the service sector rather than 
industry. Moreover, the embeddedness of policy prescriptions in the new classical reasoning 
known as the Washington Consensus left little room for active industrial or sectoral policies 
in general across the region.  
As a consequence of the above-mentioned, the deindustrialization of CEECs was far more 
pronounced than that in the rest of the EU, particularly during the 1990s. In the years that 
followed, the development paths of individual countries diverged. While in some countries 
new industries replaced traditional uncompetitive sectors, in others such as Croatia the 
deindustrialization and a decline in the competitiveness of existing industries continued. 
Bartlett (2014) points out that in some of the new EU member states industrial development 
takes the form of a “low path” characterized by standardized price competitive industries, 
while more advanced CEECs follow the “high path” that embodies more sophisticated 
industries with greater value added and higher growth potential. The shape of economic 
structure in individual CEECs was also related to the progress in their integration into 
regional, European and global economic and political associations. While most advanced 
countries soon reaped benefits from access to new markets, knowledge and technology, those 
lagging behind had to cope with destruction of established business networks and barriers in 
access to markets of EU member states and some candidate countries.  
While integration into economic and political associations was important, perhaps the most 
profound influence on structural changes in individual CEECs came as a result of policy 
prescriptions governing their transition. Bartlett (2014) points to the detrimental effects of 
horizontal policies on the industrial potential of some of the new EU member states such as 
Croatia, Bulgaria or Romania. Similarly, Cerovic et al. (2014) point out that the absence of 
industrial policy was the key reason for absent or slow recovery in transition economies, 
while Damiani and Uvalic (2014) stress the necessity of a vertical approach for a new wave of 
reindustrialization in less advanced transition economies, including some CEECs. Such 
reasoning seems to be in line with current economic thinking on industrial policy. As Rodrik 
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(2009) notes, in the presence of market failures a proactive industrial policy is needed to 
provide impulse to otherwise stagnant sectors and to help them to build their competitiveness.  
The existing research on the evolution of economic structure and its implication for growth in 
CEECs has pointed to a number of issues relevant for future policy makers. However, as 
Bartlett (2014) notes, the research is yet to assess the extent to which individual countries 
followed particular paths of industrial development as well as the effects of particular 
industrial policies. In this research, the attempt is to fill this gap but also to assess the effect of 
particular policies on the deindustrialization or reindustrialization of CEECs. Our starting 
premise is that during the period of absence of active industrial policy, CEECs experienced 
two dimensions of deindustrialization: one, more general, reflected in the share of 
manufacturing in an overall economy, and the other, within the manufacturing sector, 
reflected in the development of individual industries. Using the means of shift and share 
analysis, the sources of industrial development of particular sectors and their competitive 
profiles are assessed. Finally, the model is developed that assesses the role of individual 
policies in the industrial development.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section sets the theoretical framework of the 
research and analyzes the evolution of industrial policy in CEECs over the past two decades. 
The structural trends in CEECs followed by their decomposition using shift and share analysis 
are presented in section three. The competitive profile of industries within individual 
countries is contained in section four. Section five analyzes the role of individual policies in 
the industrial development of CEECs. Section six concludes.  
 
2 The Evolution of Industrial Policy in Central and Eastern Europe 
Under the neoclassical framework, government interference in market processes is limited to 
the correction of market failures such as coordination and information failures, negative 
externalities or provision of public goods (Mazzucato, 2015). Over past decades, such 
horizontal framework in which policy measures target all economic sectors equivalently has 
been applied to numerous countries under the concept of the Washington Consensus. It leaves 
little room for sectoral policies, as any intervention is perceived as interference with market 
forces. The alternative view on economic policy emphasizes the need for governments to 
create such measures that will provide the initial impulse for particular industries through the 
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creation of appropriate policies (Greenaway and Nam, 1998). This vertical approach has been 
embodied in the development paths of world economies such as South Korea or Singapore 
that followed an outward strategy of trade and capital liberalization and export-led growth as 
well as those such as Argentina or former Yugoslavia whose development paths were more 
inward-oriented on the development of a local industrial base, preservation of employment 
and import substitution.  
The dominance of the new classical paradigm in the 1990s and 2000s meant that rather than 
targeting specific sectors, the industrial measures were limited to the creation of a favorable 
business climate for market forces to spontaneously decide on the prosperity of particular 
industries or sectors (Bartlett, 2014). The focus of industrial policy within such a framework 
was on strengthening competition and promoting the internationalization of economic 
activities (Owen, 2012) through instruments and programs such as promotion of corporate 
governance, anti-corruption policies and flexible labor market. However, the emergence of 
the recent economic downturn has pointed, among other things, to the fact that without 
government intervention, the picking up and recovery of particular sectors, and consequently 
an economy, may always not be possible. As noted by Rodrik (2009), government 
intervention enables correction of market failures that otherwise would not be remedied. 
Together with contributions emerged within the framework of endogenous growth theory, this 
paved the way for the new form of industrial policy which picks those sectors with the highest 
potential of standing the test of international markets.  
The scope for economic policy in CEECs during the past two and a half decades was 
determined with the initial conditions of transition, the overarching policy objective of joining 
the European Union and the economic reasoning of the time. Much of the measures 
undertaken in the period from the onset of transition have taken place in the framework of the 
strengthening regional, European and global economic and political integrations. In line with 
the economic thinking of that time, these measures were nested in the new classical 
framework of the Washington Consensus. As Estrin and Uvalić (2016) explained, the 
Washington Consensus held that the flow of capital, technology, knowledge and skills across 
national boundaries via FDI opens opportunities for all host economies, and that these might 
be greater for economies where the technology gap was larger so the gains from technological 
diffusion are greater.  
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In the above context, FDI had a twofold role. Firstly, FDI had a direct effect on economic 
growth through increase of investments and job creation. Secondly, the economy can also be 
stimulated indirectly via spillover effects on total factor productivity. These can take the form 
of learning about more productive methods, access to advanced technology, skills and 
training. Within such a framework, policies promoting privatization and FDI were soon 
recognized as one of the main channels for knowledge and technology transfer and structural 
change. Yet, the gains from FDI such as enterprise restructuring, export competitiveness or 
productivity growth for manufacturing were realized only in countries where the bulk of FDI 
went to this sector. In others, such as Croatia, the lesser intensity of FDI in manufacturing was 
followed by declining share of industry in employment and value added (EBRD, 2000). 
The origins of deindustrialization in CEECs can be traced back to the 1990s and the 
differences in industrial policy of that time. In Hungary, faster inflow of FDI was 
accompanied by more rapid privatization than in other countries. In Croatia, the pace of 
industrial policy was set by a privatization scheme which favored management and employees 
of firms over foreign investors (Franicevic, 1999). Bohle and Greskowitz (2012) define the 
industrial policy in CEECs of that time as policy focused on control of damage which 
emerged through the systemic breakdown of former economic systems and confronted 
inherited and mostly inefficient industries with pressure of restructuring and adaptation. 
Industrial policy measures were focused on creating proper incentives for investors in existing 
enterprises while little incentive was provided for R&D investment. The consequences of 
such an approach remain visible to this day with the intensity of R&D remaining low in these 
countries (Radosevic and Stampi Caiova, 2015).  
The results of the above-mentioned processes became visible as the differences in economic 
structure of CEECs in the second decade of transition. While advanced CEE countries shifted 
towards more technology and knowledge intensive sectors, the economic structure of 
countries such as Croatia or SEECs remained dominated by their traditional industries and 
revealed signs of eroding industrial competitiveness and deindustrialization. This process was 
further intensified in some countries such as Croatia with deskilling that brought substantial 
losses of sophisticated manufacturing output, employment and exports (Bhole and Greskovitz, 
2012). Moreover, multinational enterprises (MNE), as a type of ownership, appeared to be 
more active among CEE countries as compared to Croatia (Aralica, Račić and Redžepagić, 
2008). For CEE countries, favorable results could be found in terms of international trade in 
the same period. CEE countries except Poland in the period of 1995–2004 had higher trade 
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openness than Croatia, which implied (in that time of liberalization of international trade) a 
better competitive position of CEE countries as compared to Croatia. This is in line with 
Gligorov and Vidovic (2004) who confirmed the deterioration of Croatia’s export position in 
this period compared to CEE countries.  
After the year 2000, the economic policy was mainly centered around the goal of increasing 
the competitive environment. Yet, the concerns over competitiveness of CEECs devoted 
greater attention to the innovation activities of firms. Building on the concept of the Lisbon 
Agenda, this new approach in industrial policy emphasized the fostering of “regional 
competitiveness”, and led to the creation of programs of regional development that embodied 
new formulations of horizontal industrial policy such as (i) support for small and medium 
sized enterprises at a local level through the creation of decentralized business networks and 
industrial clusters and (ii) an emphasis on “regional innovation systems”, the “knowledge 
economy” and “knowledge transfer” from public research and higher education institutions to 
the business sector (Cooke, 2001). Thus, new programs were oriented towards development 
of new entities such as technology parks and technological clusters. Even more, this new 
approach in industrial policy influenced changes of universities, especially within developed 
countries such as EU-15 members2. These institutions started to play an important role in 
national and regional innovation systems and are increasingly perceived as instruments of 
development in these economies (Malerba et al., 2016). 
The introduction of horizontal industrial policy also required strong commitment of EU 
member states to introduce innovation as a crucial part of industrial policy, but also to 
implement new forms of coordination between science and labor policies on the one hand, 
and industrial policy on the other. Such coordination is vital for the development of 
knowledge transfer from public to private sector as well as the better alignment between the 
structure of labor market and needs of industry. Moreover, it also required the introduction of 
appropriate science-technological infrastructure and national innovation systems.  
 
Regarding empirical findings about industrial structure and industrial policy among Eastern 
European countries in the period from 2000 onwards, Bohle and Greskovitz (2012) argue that 
the processes of divergence between SEE and CEE countries were reinforced during the fast 
                                                      
2 For universities, this type of engagement is named “third mission” (in addition to education and research), 
which generally relates to the social mission of engaging in external partnerships related to community needs 
and supporting economic development, coupled with new challenges determined by the emergence of the 
“learning economy”. 
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growth period of 1999–2007. They established that in the period between 1999 and 2007 the 
share of complex-manufacturing industries in the Visegrád and Slovenian economies was 
double that of South Eastern European countries—whether output, employment or exports are 
considered. Data on employment in knowledge intensive services indicate similar variation. 
These facts reveal that CEE countries became more efficient in terms of development of new 
jobs in the service sector (these are knowledge intensive), as a result of the use of ICT.   
Empirical evidence also reveals that horizontal industrial policy measures have become 
dominant within CEECs from 2005 onwards. Bartlett (2014) notes that in Croatia over this 
period several institutions were founded that can be considered a science technology 
infrastructure. These institutions had been founded around the main urban centers and owned 
by the state or local community (Bačić and Aralica, 2016). A similar increase in the number 
of these institutions could be found in CEE countries. But, the particularity of Croatia’s 
research and innovation system was the dramatic downsize in government expenditure on 
research and development (GERD), which declined more than twenty percentage points in the 
period from 2001 to 2010 (Aralica and Redžepagić, 2012)3. In the case of CEE countries, 
Bohle and Greskovitz (2012) found that between 1999 and 2007 these countries designed 
packages of generous incentives and services to accelerate FDI inflow. Moreover, they argue 
that the foreign-owned banks showed more inclination towards the business sector including 
small and medium enterprises. 
New elements important for the development of horizontal industrial policy based on 
innovation, such as knowledge intensive entrepreneurship as well as the science-industry link, 
had their own path of development, characteristic for CEE and SEE countries only. In terms 
of development of knowledge intensive entrepreneurship in new member states (NMS), 
Radosevic (2007) found that there was a limited domestic demand for knowledge based 
products and activities, including public sector demand. This was even more so for 
knowledge intensive services. Knowledge important for firms’ growth is usually developed 
in-house so he concluded that networks connecting firms do not play an important role in 
terms of development of innovation. In terms of the science-industry link, among CEE and 
SEE countries it is a frequent appearance of the DUI (doing, using and interacting) mode of 
innovation. This mode of innovation is based on non-scientific drivers, namely learning-by-
doing, learning-by-using and learning-by-interacting (Jensen et al., 2007). These findings 
                                                      
3 This implied decrease of importance of R&D investments and innovation investments in policy agenda at that 
time in Croatia.  
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implied a non-scientific driver of innovation activities in these countries, which emphasizes 
the role of the demand side of innovation policy. 
More recent industrial policy is grouped around the Smart Specialization (SS) concept. Smart 
Specialization could be considered the EU’s version of new industrial policy (Radosevic et 
al., 2017). It has become a well-known policy approach, which applies to policy planning and 
policy implementation at the national and regional levels. Smart Specialization became an ex-
ante conditionality for the EU regional and cohesion policy (Karo and Kattel, 2015). Similar 
to the horizontal approach of industrial policy, for Smart Specialization Strategy (S3) 
innovation is a crucial activity. Even more, the similarity between these two approaches lies 
in a strong emphasis on the regional (subnational) level of activities.  
Regarding the differences when compared to previous horizontal approaches in industrial 
policy, as a policy process, S3 requires partnership between policy makers and various types 
of actors with entrepreneurial capabilities, examining of the opportunities and potentials of 
the region, and development of policies that will facilitate entrepreneurial activities in these 
areas (McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2015). Citing McCann and Ortega-Argilés (2015), 
Radosevic et al. (2017) argue that the novelty of S3 lies in an explicit prioritization and 
selectivity as well as in a departure (at least nominally) from the focus on high-tech sectors in 
EU innovation policy. The differences could appear in terms of the role of previously 
mentioned institutions like universities in creating links between science and industry. The 
fact that the EU started placing emphasis on innovation strategies for regional innovation 
systems provides universities with the opportunity to participate in tackling regional 
development issues. For the universities, the main challenges in terms of S3 should be: a) 
rationalization of the course portfolio and research capabilities of universities to match with 
industry demands and regional priorities; b) search for their place in the European/national 
innovation ecosystem – to provide the expertise at a given stage of innovation where they 
have strength and capability (EUA, 2014).  
Research and innovation strategy as an implementation activity of Smart Specialization 
differs from previous approaches in terms of positioning regions/regional clusters within 
global value chains and local production systems. In this context, regions trying to implement 
Smart Specialization Strategy should have appropriate government capacity in terms of 
including policies for entrepreneurial discovery, promoting technology platforms and 
networks, diagnostic and indicator based tools and infrastructure, strategic governance for 
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RIS34 as well as openness to other regions (OECD, 2013). Finally, there are recommendations 
to regions to develop institutional capacities in terms of identification of technology based 
development patterns, sharing the principles of the construction of regional advantages (CRA) 
approach (Boschma, 2014).   
 
 
3 (De)industrialization in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
According to Havlik (2014), before 1990 the value added generated within the manufacturing 
sector accounted for between 20 percent of gross domestic product in Hungary and 40 percent 
in countries such as Bulgaria and Poland. At the same time, the service sector in all CEECs 
was largely underdeveloped. The exceptions were countries emerging from the dissolution of 
former Yugoslavia, such as Croatia and Slovenia. The somewhat more liberal economic 
environment of a semi-market economy that came in place during the 1960s and the great 
degree of openness towards Western countries had formed an economic structure which bore 
more resemblance to market economies than any other CEEC. The initial wave of transition 
reforms paved the way for narrowing of these structural differences and by the end of the last 
century the economic structure of most CEECs showed much resemblance to mature market 
economies.  
Figure 1 Share of Manufacturing in Value Added and Employment, 2000–2015 
Value added Employment 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat data. 
The opening of a new millennium was marked with similar trends (Figure 1). Broadly 
speaking, one can distinguish three patterns of changes in the share of manufacturing value 
added in the economy between 2000 and 2015. The share of manufacturing in value added 
                                                      
4 Research and innovation strategies for Smart Specialization. 
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increased in Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria, remained constant in the Czech Republic, 
Lithuania and Romania, and decreased in Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia and particularly Croatia 
and Latvia. Across the region, the manufacturing sector employed on average 19 percent of 
the workforce in 2000. In the years that followed, this share was continuously decreasing, the 
fall being particularly pronounced in Slovenia, Croatia and Hungary. In Slovenia, the 
employment in manufacturing dropped by 25 percentage points, while the fall in the latter two 
countries amounted to 22 percentage points. 
Observing changes in the manufacturing value added and employment together, conclusions 
can be made about two patterns of industrial development. Countries such as the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania have gone through contraction 
of manufacturing workforce while keeping the share of manufacturing value added constant 
or increasing. It can thus be concluded that in these countries restructuring of the 
manufacturing sector in terms of labor intensity and increasing productivity has taken place. 
On the other hand, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and particularly Croatia and Slovenia have been 
marked with contraction of both manufacturing value added and employment shares in the 
economy. Such trends suggest that a decline in competitiveness of manufacturing and 
deindustrialization could be in place in these countries.  
Further evidence in favor of the above reasoning can be found in Figure 2. There it can be 
seen that across the entire region the labor intensity of the entire manufacturing sector has 
been continuously decreasing, a continuation of the trend that started in the first decade of 
transition. Already in 2000, labor intensity of manufacturing was below 15 percent in all 
countries except Bulgaria and Romania. By 2015, Bulgaria was the only country with labor 
intensity above 5 percent, while in all other countries the production structure of 
manufacturing seems to have changed. It is worth noting, though, that a decline of labor 
intensity in all countries took place mostly in the first half of the 2000s. During the crisis and 
in the post-crisis period, this productive pattern remained stagnant.  
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Figure 2 Labor Intensity of Manufacturing, 2000–2015 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat data. 
The sources of the above-mentioned changes can be found in the policy mix within individual 
countries as mentioned in the previous section. While some CEECs recognized the necessity 
of implementing sectoral policies, in others the policy framework continued to be dominated 
by horizontal policy measures intended to ensure macroeconomic stability and functioning of 
the market mechanism. In a parallel development, trade liberalization together with a rise in 
the living standard increased the inflow of imports in practically all countries. While in some 
countries improving export competitiveness and restructuring of the domestic manufacturing 
sector managed to offset the pressure of imports, in others the manufacturing sector 
continuously declined. The low intensity of FDI or its flow into sectors other than 
manufacturing, together with the absence of active sectoral policies and the continuous 
pressure of imports on the domestic market, have eroded the industrial base in these countries.  
A deeper insight into the factors behind industrial development patterns in all analyzed 
countries requires observing all or some of them together. A recent method proposed by 
Tregenna (2011) and implemented by Stojcic and Aralica (2016) establishes the link between 
changes in the sectoral share of employment, changes in the labor intensity of the sector, 
changes in its competitiveness (and thus value added) and overall national competitiveness5. 
Through such decomposition one can extract three components, where the first component 
measures the contribution of changes in the labor intensity of the sector, the second one 
establishes a link between changes in the value added and employment of the sector, and the 
third is related to the contribution of improvements (or deterioration) of the overall national 
productivity.  
                                                      
5 For a detailed explanation, see the Appendix.  
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Through the above-described analysis one can understand the causes of deindustrialization (or 
industrialization) in individual CEECs. The changes in the share of manufacturing 
employment due to the changing labor intensity of manufacturing can be a signal of sectoral 
restructuring and a shift in production structure. The change in sectoral employment due to 
changes in the value added of manufacturing signals the changes of sectoral competitiveness. 
Finally, the third component reveals to what extent improvements in the overall productivity 
of the country drive employment changes within the manufacturing sector. The results of 
decomposition for the 2000–2015 period are graphically presented in Figure 36. For 
expositional convenience, Figure 3 contains only results for labor intensity and 
competitiveness effects. The reasons for such a presentation lie in the fact that in all analyzed 
countries the aggregate productivity effect was positive. Hence, the extraction of the 
contribution to the changes in the manufacturing employment share by overall economic 
performance of the country enables the search for sources of (de)industrialization to focus on 
changes in labor intensity and competitiveness.  
The horizontal axis of the scatterplot in Figure 3 measures the changes in labor intensity 
(LEF), while the contribution of changes in sectoral competitiveness (SEF) is portrayed on the 
vertical axis. The first finding is that in all analyzed countries the contribution of the labor 
intensity effect to the pattern of industrial development is negative. Such a finding, consistent 
with the explanations offered for the findings in Figures 1 and 2, further confirms that 
restructuring of manufacturing was underway across CEECs in the observed period. This 
process, which started already in the 1990s, took place along two dimensions. On the one 
hand, across all CEECs a movement from labor intensive sectors towards medium high and 
high technology intensive industries took place. On the other hand, within more sophisticated 
sectors, some CEECs specialized in labor intensive production activities while others 
succeeded in integrating into segments of global value chains with greater value added and 
based on knowledge and technology activities.  
  
                                                      
6 For detailed results, see Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 3 Labor Intensity and Sectoral Share Effects of Changes 
in the Share of Manufacturing Employment, 2000–2015 
 
                          Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The conclusion from the above is that the sources of industrial development patterns within 
individual CEECs can be found in changes of manufacturing competitiveness. Here, the 
findings confirm our earlier conclusions. It is evident that in countries characterized by a 
reduction in manufacturing employment and stagnation or improvement of the value added 
generated within the sector, this change was driven by a decline in labor intensity, 
improvement in sectoral competitiveness and greater productivity of the entire sector. Such a 
finding holds for all five countries identified previously as ones where reindustrialization has 
taken place. In all the other countries, changes in the manufacturing employment share have 
been driven by a decline in labor intensity and in the competitiveness of the manufacturing 
sector. It is, therefore, likely that one of two potential scenarios has taken place in these 
countries. The first one refers to the fact that traditional, mainly labor intensive industries 
have lost their competitiveness over the second decade of transition, while new industries 
have not replaced them. An alternative explanation is, however, that the substitution of 
traditional industries with new sectors was not accompanied by success in building 
competitiveness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
19
4 Structural Trends within the Manufacturing Sector in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
The transformation of the manufacturing sector in more advanced CEECs was already 
underway from the second half of the 1990s. These early attempts at integration into global 
value chains took place mostly through a shift from low-tech towards high technology 
intensive industries. However, within the latter group of industries, producers from CEECs 
mainly participated in standardized labor intensive production activities in line with their 
comparative advantages of the time (Stojcic and Hashi, 2011). In the years that followed, 
producers from some of the CEECs managed to penetrate more sophisticated segments of 
global value chains, while in others the manufacturing sector remained locked within old 
production patterns.  
Figure 4 Structure of Manufacturing Sector by Technological Intensity in 2005 and 2015 
2005 2015 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 4 presents the share of individual sectors within manufacturing, grouped by their 
technological intensity, following Eurostat taxonomy and calculated using data from the 
Prodcomm database. It can be seen that across CEECs a structural change took place within 
the manufacturing sector. Out of five countries identified previously as revealing signs of 
reindustrialization (the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Lithuania), in four the 
shares of medium high and high technology intensive industries within manufacturing have 
increased. The exception from this is the Czech Republic where an increase is recorded only 
in the share of medium high technology intensive industries.  
Among the countries revealing traits of deindustrialization, the changes in the shares of 
individual groups of industries within the manufacturing sector do not provide a clear picture. 
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All these countries have exhibited an increase in the share of either medium high or high 
technology intensive industries. It is therefore likely that the deindustrialization of these 
countries is driven by the loss of competitiveness in traditional and emerging industries. 
The above reasoning requires a closer analysis of the changes in the international 
competitiveness of the manufacturing sector as a whole and its subsectors in particular 
(Figure 5). Overall, it can be said that the value of exports increased in all analyzed countries. 
When it comes to unit values of exports, the majority of countries have experienced an 
increase in this respect which can be a signal either of declining price competitiveness or 
improvements in the quality of products. As we have established, in several countries 
deindustrialization was accompanied by declining competitiveness and an increase in the 
share of low technology intensive industries where price competitiveness is the primary mode 
of competition. Figure 5 reveals that highest export unit values are observed within these 
deindustrializing countries. Together, these findings signal a decline in the price 
competitiveness of manufacturing in selected CEECs.  
Figure 5 Export Value Index and Export Unit Values of Manufacturing in CEECs, 2005–2015 
Export value index (2005 = 100) Export unit values 
        Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The analysis of changes in export unit values across groups of industries supports our 
reasoning about the loss of competitiveness as the primary source of deindustrialization in 
some of the CEECs (Figure 6). Among reindustrializing CEECs, the highest increase in the 
export unit values took place in sectors with higher technological intensity. On the other hand, 
in countries exhibiting traits of deindustrialization, an increase in export unit values is 
observed across all four groups of industries. It is therefore likely that the observed decline of 
manufacturing in terms of both value added and employment as well as evidence on declining 
competitiveness of the sector signal the inability of producers from these countries to position 
themselves on international markets and to build their competitiveness within the sectors in 
which they operate.  
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Figure 6 Export Unit Values and Technological Intensity of Sectors, 2005–2015 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The final insight into the changes within the manufacturing sectors of CEECs concerns 
changes in productivity, embodied in the production and sophistication of goods exported by 
producers from this sector. Integration into higher segments of global value chains entails 
products of higher value added and greater sophistication. For a considerable period of time, 
CEECs were known as producers of low value added standardized goods. Even countries that 
moved, in the second decade of transition, to the more technology intensive segments of the 
market have been involved in activities such as assembly or similar price competitive 
activities. The assessment of changes in productivity and export sophistication of 
manufacturing goods in CEECs can be undertaken using the means of productivity and export 
indices originally proposed by Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007). After modification to 
focus solely on the manufacturing sector, the productivity index for individual good i 
produced by n countries can be defined as:  
 
ܴܱܲܦ ௜ܻ ൌ ∑
ೣ೔ೕ
೉ೕ
∑ ೣ೔ೕ೉ೕ
೙ೕసభ
௡௝ୀଵ ∗ ܴܱܲܦ௝,  (1) 
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where productivity of manufacturing sector PRODj, defined as value added per employee, is 
weighted with the comparative advantage of a given country in sector i. From there, the index 
of productivity embodied in the production of a given sector or good is obtained through 
aggregation of weighted productivity of manufacturing across all countries. Figure 7 provides 
the evolution of productivity defined this way across all CEECs. As can be seen, with the 
exception of a short period during the economic crisis, productivity of the manufacturing 
sector was following the trend of aggregate productivity growth observed in the region during 
the period. 
  
Figure 7 Average Productivity of Manufacturing Industries in CEECs, 2005–2015 
 
                                    Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Within the manufacturing sector, productivity improvements have been recorded in all 
sectors. However, cross-sectoral intensity of the embodied productivity differs across sectors 
with respect to their technological intensity. The strongest levels of productivity in CEECs 
have been recorded in low technology intensive industries. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum are high technology sophisticated sectors. Such a finding is in line with arguments 
about specialization of CEEC producers in low value added sectors and their position in the 
lower end of global value chains within more sophisticated manufacturing industries.  
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Figure 8 Average Productivity of Manufacturing Industries in CEECs, 2005–2015  
(by Technological Intensity) 
 
                                    Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The productivity embodied within sectors does not provide insights into the competitive 
profiles of the industries. To obtain such findings one needs to observe the sophistication of 
their exports. Departing from the previously used PRODY index, the level of sophistication 
embodied in the exports of product i can be derived as:  
 
ܧܺܲ ௝ܻ ൌ ∑ ௫೔ೕ௑ೕ
௡௜ୀଵ ܴܱܲܦ ௜ܻ, (2) 
 
where the level of productivity embodied in each product is weighted with its share in the 
total export basket of manufacturing goods within the country. To this end, it is possible to 
obtain insights into the level of sophistication embodied in the overall manufacturing exports 
of each CEEC and in the exports of their industries of different technological intensity.  
Figure 9: Export Sophistication of the Manufacturing Sector in CEECs, 2005–2015 
 
                                         Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The trends of export sophistication in individual CEECs reveal continuous upgrading in the 
embodied level of productivity. This trend is present in all countries although the magnitude 
of increase reveals cross-country variation. The strongest improvement in the level of export 
sophistication has taken place within manufacturing in Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech 
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Republic, Estonia and Slovenia. Within the manufacturing sector, in the production of 
standardized price competitive goods within low technology intensive industries the highest 
levels of export sophistication were found in the three Baltic states and Croatia. The same 
countries were among the leaders in terms of sophistication in this sector already in 2005, 
suggesting that patterns of competitiveness inherited from the early period of transition were 
governing the manufacturing sector in these countries. Moving up the technological intensity 
ladder, lower levels of export sophistication can be observed. Within medium low technology 
intensive industries, the highest index values are found in Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Slovenia 
and Slovakia. However, the findings for this sector in 2015 are somewhat different from those 
in 2005 when the Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia were the leaders of the sector.  
 
Figure 10: Export Sophistication of the Manufacturing Sector in CEECs, 2005–2015  
(by Technological Intensity) 
   Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
In the upper technological segment of manufacturing, countries identified as reindustrializing 
lead in terms of export sophistication. Interestingly, relatively high levels of export 
sophistication are found in countries revealing signs of deindustrialization such as Slovakia 
and Slovenia. There is a similar finding in the segment of high technology intensive industries 
where Czech, Hungarian, Estonian and Latvian manufacturers exhibit the highest levels of 
export sophistication.  
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With respect to everything said in this section, it can be concluded that the manufacturing 
sector within CEECs experienced substantial restructuring in the more advanced stage of 
transition. While in some countries this resulted in an increase in the share of manufacturing 
within the economy, in others the changes took the direction of deindustrialization. Our 
findings suggest that across all countries an increase in the share of high technology intensive 
activities and improvements in productivity and export sophistication have taken place. For 
this reason, the deindustrialization of these countries can be attributed to their loss of 
competitiveness, as indicated in the previous section.  
 
5 Determinants of Industrial Development in CEECs  
As a final step of investigation, the research explores the determinants of the changes in the 
manufacturing share of value added in Central and Eastern European countries. Having 
established in previous sections the patterns of industrial development within individual 
CEECs, the question that arises is which forces and policies have contributed to the observed 
outcome. To this end, an empirical model is developed that takes into account a number of 
country and industry specific characteristics together with indicators reflecting the progress of 
individual countries in pursuit of reforming policies. A model developed for such purpose in 
general form can be expressed as: 
 
݈݊ݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜௧ ൌ ݈݊݁ݔ݌ݕ௜௧ ൅ ݈ܾ݊݁ݎ݀௜௧ ൅ ݈݊݃݁ݎ݀௜௧ ൅ ݈݈ܾ݊ܽܿ݋ݏݐ௜௧ ൅ ݈݊݁݌݋௜௧ ൅ ݈݊݅ܿݐݏ݈݈݇݅ݏ௜௧ ൅
݈݊ܿ݋݊ݏݑ݉݌ݐ݅݋݊௜௧ ൅ ݈݂݊݀݅௜௧ ൅ ݈݊݌ݎ݋݌݁ݎݐݕݎ݄݅݃ݐݏ௜௧ ൅ ݈݊ݐܽݔܾݑݎ݀݁݊௜௧ ൅
݈݊ݐݎ݂ܽ݀݁ݎ݁݁݀݋݉௜௧ ൅ ݈݊݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ݂ݎ݁݁݀݋݉௜௧ ൅ ݈ܾ݊ݑݏ݅݊݁ݏݏ݂ݎ݁݁݀݋݉௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜ ൅ ݒ௜௧.   (3) 
The dependent variable used by the model in equation (3) is the share of manufacturing in 
value added for country i, member of CEEC group, in period t. Such a defined dependent 
variable is specified as a function of several variables defined as follows. Export 
sophistication index (expy) controls for the improvements in the productivity of exports. As 
established in previous sections, across CEECs, an improvement in the productivity of the 
manufacturing sector has taken place over the past decade, having an upward impact on the 
sophistication of manufacturing goods exported from these countries, particularly goods in 
low and medium low technology intensive industries. Such an improvement can present a 
source of higher competitiveness over international rivals, for which reason a positive sign is 
expected on the variable. 
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In their influential paper, Jensen et al. (2007) point to two main channels for productivity 
improvements within firms and industries, defined as the science, technology and innovation 
(STI) and doing, using and interacting (DUI) modes of innovation. The former refers to the 
absorption and management of knowledge defined outside of firms, most commonly in the 
science sector or through interactions with customers and suppliers. The latter, however, 
encompasses the processes that take place within firms through new structures and 
relationships which facilitate learning by doing, using and interacting. Both channels have 
implications for improvements in sophistication and embodied productivity of exported 
goods. However, while the DUI concept is difficult to measure (Jensen et al., 2007), the 
extraction of effects related to STI is far more easier. To this end, the model includes two 
variables defined as the share of the business sector expenditure (berd) and government 
expenditure (gerd) on R&D within overall R&D expenditure in country i in period t.  
Through the inclusion of variables measuring the share of R&D expenditure, one can also 
distinguish between two forms of policy towards innovation funding. Within the horizontal 
policy approach, the role of government is limited to the creation of an environment that 
facilitates innovation activities, and funding of such activities should come from the private 
sector. However, proponents of an active government role in innovation policy note that the 
impulse for innovations should come from public investment in R&D. The inclusion of both 
variables should therefore highlight an additional dimension of policy making in CEECs. 
Finally, the model includes the number of patents per capita (epo). It is expected that greater 
innovation output facilitates the competitiveness of knowledge and technology intensive 
industries.  
While innovations are a relevant generator of competitiveness for the knowledge and 
technology driven industries, the costs of labor have a decisive role in labor intensive and 
price competitive sectors. To control for this source of competitiveness, the model also 
includes an index of labor costs (labcosts) for each country-year pair, where 2010 is taken as 
the reference period. It is expected that lower costs of labor have a beneficial effect on the rise 
of price competitive manufacturing, while the opposite would hold for knowledge and 
technology driven sectors. The model also includes the proportion of workers with ICT skills 
(ictskills), which are an important driver of competitiveness for more sophisticated industries. 
The share of foreign direct investment (fdi) in manufacturing is included to control for 
spillover channels recognized in earlier transition literature as a source of enterprise 
restructuring, productivity improvements and higher export competitiveness. However, the 
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effect of this variable depends on the motives of FDI. Rent-seeking FDI and that not 
establishing horizontal and vertical links with domestic business entities should have an 
adverse effect on the domestic manufacturing sector. For this reason, there is no a priori 
expectation about the sign of this variable.  
The share of domestic household consumption (consumption) is recognized in existing 
literature as an important driver of industrial development. The profile of domestic demand 
and its requirements determines the behavior of domestic producers and in turn determines 
their competitiveness and prospects of the manufacturing sector. Producers in those countries 
where domestic buyers exhibit preferences for sophisticated knowledge and technology 
intensive goods will be under pressure to continuously come up with innovative products that 
can stand the test of foreign rivals. The inability to do so, however, would have an adverse 
effect on their performance and overall domestic production. For this reason, the expectation 
about the sign of this variable cannot be made. There are also five variables measuring the 
progress of individual CEECs in pursuit of reforms essential for the creation and functioning 
of a free market environment. These include the quality of protection of property rights 
(property rights), the level of tax burden (tax burden), the freedom of trade (trade freedom), 
the freedom of investment (investment freedom) and the freedom of doing business (business 
freedom). For all of these variables, a positive sign is expected.  
The data for estimation of the previously defined model are taken from Eurostat and from the 
Heritage Foundation in the case of the five institutional variables. All variables enter the 
model in logarithmic form. The estimation is undertaken using the means of fixed effects 
instrumental variables panel estimator which enables estimation of panel models with 
potentially endogenous variables and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. The former is 
present in the model through correlation between the export sophistication index and some of 
the other regressors, while the latter refers to unobservable factors such as the quality of 
institutional framework not controlled for within the model or the quality of management etc. 
The potentially endogenous variable is instrumented with its own lagged values and for this 
reason the analysis covers the 2009–2015 period, the years through and after the global 
economic downturn. Moreover, to allow for effects of institutional changes, variables 
measuring these effects have been lagged for two periods.  
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Table 1 Results of Estimation 
Variable Coefficient 
Export sophistication (lnexpy) 0.29*** 
Business sector expenditure on research and development (lnberd) -0.08** 
Government expenditure on research and development (lngerd) -0.09** 
Labor costs index (lnlabcosts) -0.16** 
EPO patents per capita (lnepo) -0.02** 
% of employment with ICT skills (lnictskills) 0.01 
Domestic consumption as % of GDP (lnconsumption) -0.96*** 
FDI share of manufacturing (lnfdi) -0.001*** 
Property rights protection (lnpropertyrights) 0.03 
Tax burden (lntaxburden) -0.05 
Trade freedom (lntradefreedom) -0.64*** 
Investment freedom (lninvestmentfreedom) -0.18*** 
Freedom of doing business (lnbusinessfreedom) 0.14 
Model diagnostics  
Underidentification test 59.48*** 
Weak identification test 155.1 
Sargan overidentification test  0.872 
Number of observations (groups) 77 (11) 
Note: ***,** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The results of estimation of the above-described model are presented in Table 1. All relevant 
diagnostics provide support to the chosen model specification meaning that the 
underidentification test is rejected, the value of weak identification test is above critical values 
and there is no sufficient evidence to reject the Sargan test for overidentification of 
instruments. Overall, these diagnostics provide support to our specification and enable an 
interpretation of the results.  
Starting with the export sophistication index, it is evident that higher sophistication of 
exports, reflecting greater embodied productivity of exported goods and services, has a 
beneficial effect on the share of the manufacturing sector within CEECs. An increase in 
export sophistication for 1 percentage point contributes to an increase in the share of 
manufacturing within the economy of 0.49 percentage points. The improvements in 
productivity do not seem, however, to arise from innovation activities. Both variables 
measuring public and business sector investment in research and expenditure as well as the 
variable measuring the patenting activity are significant with a negative sign. Several 
conclusions can be made from this finding. First and most important is that innovation 
activities have an adverse effect on the size of the manufacturing sector. Another important 
finding is that neither private nor public policies promoting innovation have a beneficial 
effect on the manufacturing sector. Finally, from the above findings it can be concluded that 
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the STI principle of innovation does not seem to be a relevant channel for realization of 
innovation effects.  
The effects of foreign direct investment as well as domestic consumption of households do 
not facilitate development of the domestic manufacturing sector since both variables emerge 
as significant with a negative sign. The observed effect of foreign direct investment can be 
interpreted with the structure and motives of FDI. In some CEECs such as Croatia the 
entrance of FDI was mainly driven by rent-seeking motives and directed at sectors outside of 
manufacturing. Even though in some CEECs FDI facilitated the development of 
manufacturing, it is likely that the structure of the sample is such that it drives findings 
towards the above conclusion. The negative effect of domestic consumption can signal that 
domestic producers are unable to meet the requirements of households in their countries, 
which in turn paves the way for imports and erodes domestic manufacturing. Another likely 
explanation is that the structure of domestic demand in CEECs is not such that it provides 
sufficient impulse for improvement in the competitiveness of domestic producers.  
As a final group of variables, we observe the findings on the controls for the quality of the 
institutional framework. Out of five included regressors, a significant coefficient with a 
negative sign is obtained on measures for the freedom of trade and that of investment. These 
findings are in line with everything said earlier. They signal that removal of trade and 
investment barriers paves the way for an inflow of imports which destroys domestic 
producers and leads to shrinking of the domestic manufacturing sector. Moreover, such 
findings question new classical policy prescriptions that dominated CEECs through much of 
their transition. According to these, creation of an environment in which market forces can act 
freely without government intervention is a sufficient condition for the development of 
domestic industries. However, it is more likely that the creation of such an environment 
without building the competitiveness of domestic industries has an adverse effect on them and 
eventually can lead to the disappearance of domestic manufacturing.  
Overall, the findings obtained in this section suggest that deindustrialization in CEECs was 
driven by two sets of factors, the first being horizontal policies that leave domestic producers 
exposed on international markets and the second being policy measures intended to promote 
integration of CEECs into segments of global value chains for which they lack the resources 
needed to successfully compete. The former is in line with the findings of Bartlett (2014) who 
identifies horizontal policies as the primary reason for erosion of the industrial base in South 
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Eastern and some Central Eastern European countries. At the opposite end, the principal 
driver of reindustrialization appears to be export competitiveness based on the improvements 
in sophistication and embodied productivity. Such a finding may signal establishment of 
product space networks through which knowledge spillovers transfer among producers within 
and between CEECs in related industries, as outlined by Hausmann and Hidalgo (2008). 
Moreover, together with other reported findings it is likely that these spillovers emerge 
through the DUI rather than the STI mode of innovation.  
 
6 Conclusion 
Over the past two and a half decades, Central and Eastern European countries have gone 
through several policy experiments intended to transform these countries into competitive 
market economies, trigger growth and increase the well-being of their citizens. Recently, the 
focus of both policy makers and academics interested in the above objectives has been 
shifting towards reindustrialization. Traditional arguments about the beneficial effects of 
manufacturing, both in itself and for other sectors of economy, are again being evoked and the 
arising question for not only CEECs but the entire EU is how to initiate a new wave of 
industrial development. Policy packages implemented in CEECs through their transition have 
approached this issue from various perspectives. In the early stages of transition, it was 
largely held that the creation of market institutions was a sufficient condition to shape an 
optimal market structure. The years that followed have pointed to the necessity of additional 
activities that would govern economic performance and restructuring of these economies. 
This second set of policies has been mostly concerned with building knowledge societies 
whose industries are knowledge and technology intensive and successfully integrated into 
higher segments of global value chains.  
 
The emergence of the recent economic downturn has exposed the weaknesses of such an 
approach that does not target specific sectors but rather consists of measures applicable to an 
entire economy. Evidence gathered over more than a decade reveals that not only have 
CEECs failed to integrate into high value added segments of global value chains, but in some 
of them the processes of deindustrialization have continued. Such scenarios require revisiting 
policies at whose core is active industrial policy focused on sectors with the greatest potential 
for gradual integration into global value chains. Hence, rather than focusing on a specific 
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group of industries and building their competitiveness, this new policy framework suggests 
identification of industries with the greatest potential and building of their international 
competitiveness through continuously climbing up the ladders of global value chains.  
The appropriateness and mutual exclusivity and complementarity of these policy frameworks 
have been the subject of much debate in recent years. Neither academics nor policy makers 
agree on the optimality of any of these approaches. Moreover, some researchers point to the 
lack of relevant data about more recent trends within the manufacturing sectors of CEECs. 
Bearing the above said in mind, the objective of this paper was twofold. Its first task was to 
assess the evolution of economic policy towards manufacturing and trends that have taken 
place in this sector over the past decade and a half, while its second task was to evaluate the 
effects of individual policy measures on the development of manufacturing in CEECs.  
The results of the investigation reveal two groups of CEECs, following the paths of 
reindustrialization and deindustrialization, respectively. The sources of such divergent paths 
seem to lie in the differences in their competitiveness. While in more advanced CEECs 
increases in aggregate productivity and reductions of labor intensity have been accompanied 
by improvements in the value added of the manufacturing sector and its competitiveness, in 
others domestic producers have not been able to follow such a path. It appears, though, that 
manufacturing in CEECs is still very much based on less knowledge and technology intensive 
industries and that any improvements in productivity or position in global value chains are 
related to processes taking place within these two segments of manufacturing.  
Our analysis of the determinants behind the more recent industrial development in CEECs 
reveals interesting findings. Little support was found for the old approach of creation of free 
market institutions. In fact, it appears that trade and investment liberalization have an adverse 
effect on domestic manufacturing, most likely reflecting the inability of domestic producers to 
compete with the inflow of imports and to exploit the opportunities of the joint EU market. A 
similar effect is yielded by policies promoting inflow of foreign direct investment and 
investment in research and development. In light of our findings, the question arises whether 
incentives provided to foreign investors are warranted. Moreover, policies intended to 
promote investment in research and development as the leading source of innovation are also 
challenged by our findings, regardless of their source. Rather than initiating 
reindustrialization, these measures can be associated with deindustrializing processes which 
questions both their effectiveness and the absorption capacity of domestic firms. 
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Our findings, however, suggest that improvements in export competitiveness are a principal 
driver of reindustrialization. In this context, the strongest improvements in export 
sophistication and its embodied productivity have been observed in standardized sectors. It is 
likely that in these sectors quality upgrading is taking place as well as integration into higher 
segments of global value chains. Some recent theories associate improvements in export 
sophistication with product space clustering within and between countries through spillovers 
between related industries. Given the findings from our analysis about similar patterns of 
productivity and export upgrading in all CEECs, it is likely that such a mechanism is in place 
here as well. A more detailed analysis based on supply-use and input-output data would 
provide more insight in that direction.  
The question that arises from our investigation is what kind of policy should be implemented 
by those CEECs revealing signs of deindustrialization to trigger a new wave of industrial 
development and increase their growth prospects. Based on our findings, such policies should 
not stem from the package of traditional policy frameworks at whose core is the assumption 
about the ability of markets to independently lead to optimal allocation and economic 
structure. Rather, future policies in such CEECs should identify within existing sectors those 
with the greatest potential of market success that can serve as wheels of future development. 
Identification of barriers to quality upgrading and climbing up ladders of global value chains 
in these sectors will be the key prerequisite of future growth and reversal of trends of 
deindustrialization. 
 
Acknowledgement: This work was fully supported by Croatian Science Foundation under 
the project IP-2016-06-3764. 
 
  
 
 
33
Appendix 
The starting point of such an analysis is the assumption that the share of a particular sector 
(e.g. industry) in the total employment of a given country and year can be decomposed in the 
three components measuring the contribution to the change of sectoral share of employment 
shifts in the labor intensity of the sector, its share in overall value added and economy-wide 
changes in labor productivity. Such a relationship can be defined with an identity: 
ߪ௜௝௧ ≡ ௅೔ೕ೟௅ೕ೟ ≡ ߶௜௝௧ߜ௜௝௧ߠ௝௧ (A1) 
where σijt is the share of employment from sector i from country j in the year t (Lijt) in total 
employment of a given country and year (Ljt). To construct an identity decomposing the share 
of industry employment in total country employment, the Lijt = φijtQijt identity can be 
established where Qijt is sector i’s value added and φijt is labor intensity of that sector, 
measured as L୧୨୲ Q୧୨୲⁄ . In addition, let term θ୨୲ ൌ Q୨୲ L୨୲⁄  be labor productivity of country j in 
period t and δijt is the share of sector i in total value added in country j in the period t defined 
as Q୧୨୲ Q୨୲⁄ . After all necessary calculations, the equation can be expressed as:  
 
∆σ୧୨୲ ൌ ଵ଺ ൫ϕ୧୨୲ െ ϕ୧୨୲ି୬൯൛൫δ୧୨୲ି୬θ୨୲ି୬ ൅ δ୧୨୲θ୨୲൯ ൅ ሺθ୨୲ି୬ ൅ θ୨୲ሻሺδ୧୨୲ି୬ ൅ δ୧୨୲ሻൟ ൅ଵ
଺ ൫δ୧୨୲ െ δ୧୨୲ି୬൯൛൫ϕ୧୨୲ି୬θ୨୲ି୬ ൅ ϕ୧୨୲θ୨୲൯ ൅ ሺθ୨୲ି୬ ൅ θ୨୲ሻሺϕ୧୨୲ି୬ ൅ ϕ୧୨୲ሻൟ ൅
ଵ
଺ ൫θ୧୨୲ െ
θ୧୨୲ି୬൯൛൫ϕ୧୨୲ି୬δ୨୲ି୬ ൅ ϕ୧୨୲δ୨୲൯ ൅ ሺδ୨୲ି୬ ൅ δ୨୲ሻሺϕ୧୨୲ି୬ ൅ ϕ୧୨୲ሻൟ. (A2) 
 
In equation (A2), the component ଵ଺ ൫ϕ୧୨୲ െ ϕ୧୨୲ି୬൯൛൫δ୧୨୲ି୬θ୨୲ି୬ ൅ δ୧୨୲θ୨୲൯ ൅ ሺθ୨୲ି୬ ൅
θ୨୲ሻሺδ୧୨୲ି୬ ൅ δ୧୨୲ሻൟ measures the labor intensity effect of changes in the sector employment. 
ଵ
଺ ൫δ୧୨୲ െ δ୧୨୲ି୬൯൛൫ϕ୧୨୲ି୬θ୨୲ି୬ ൅ ϕ୧୨୲θ୨୲൯ ൅ ሺθ୨୲ି୬ ൅ θ୨୲ሻሺϕ୧୨୲ି୬ ൅ ϕ୧୨୲ሻൟ measures the 
contribution of changes in the share of the sector in total value added of the region to changes 
in the share of the sector in total employment. Finally, the aggregate labor productivity effect 
ଵ
଺ ൫θ୧୨୲ െ θ୧୨୲ି୬൯൛൫ϕ୧୨୲ି୬δ୨୲ି୬ ൅ ϕ୧୨୲δ୨୲൯ ൅ ሺδ୨୲ି୬ ൅ δ୨୲ሻሺϕ୧୨୲ି୬ ൅ ϕ୧୨୲ሻൟ is a residual in the 
equation that will measure the contribution of changes in aggregate labor productivity to 
changes in the share of the sector in total regional employment. 
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Table A1 Results of Decomposition of Changes in the Share  
of Manufacturing Employment, 2000–2015 
Country 
Change in the 
share of 
manufacturing 
employment 
(p.p.) 
Labor 
intensity effect 
(1) 
Sectoral share 
effect 
(2) 
Aggregate 
productivity 
effect  
(3) 
Control 
(1 + 2 + 3 = 
100) 
BGR -0.18 -946 85 761 -100 
CZE -0.07 -2434 69 2265 -100 
EST -0.22 -752 -61 713 -100 
CRO -0.30 -292 -74 266 -100 
LAT -0.18 -577 -146 623 -100 
LHV -0.14 -1051 13 939 -100 
HUN -0.33 -463 32 331 -100 
POL -0.05 -2301 218 1983 -100 
ROM -0.04 -5421 -6 5327 -100 
SVK -0.19 -1008 -64 972 -100 
SVN -0.46 -255 -31 186 -100 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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